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The paper presents a survey and analysis of the current security measures implemented in cloud computing and
the hypervisors that support it. The viability of an efficient virtualization layer has led to an explosive growth in the
cloud computing industry, exemplified by Amazon’s Elastic Cloud, Apple’s iCloud, and Google’s Cloud Platform.
However, the growth of any sector in computing often leads to increased security risks. This paper explores these
risks and the evolution of mitigation techniques in open source cloud computing. Unlike uniprocessor security, the
use of a large number of nearly identical processors acts as a vulnerability amplifier: a single vulnerability being
replicated thousands of times throughout the computing infrastructure. Currently, the community is employing a
diverse set of techniques in response to the perceived risk. These include malware prevention and detection, secure
virtual machine managers, and cloud resilience. Unfortunately, this approach results in a disjoint response based
more on detection of known threats rather than mitigation of new or zero-day threats, which are often left
undetected. An alternative way forward is to address this issue by leveraging the strengths from each technique in
combination with a focus on increasing attacker workload. This approach would make malicious operation time
consuming and deny persistence on mission time-scales. It could be accomplished by incorporating migration,
non-determinism, and resilience into the fabric of virtualization.
Keywords: Vulnerability amplifier; Malware prevention and detection; Secure virtual machine managers; Cloud
resilience; Zero-day; Increasing attacker workload; Virtual machine; View comparison-based malware detectionIntroduction
Virtualization of servers in the cloud operates by adding a
new layer to the software stack known as the hypervisor
[1] or Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) [2]. The hypervi-
sor encapsulates the hardware, allowing it to be used by
multiple operating system instances concurrently. This
flexibility, coupled with the cost and performance advan-
tages of sharing the underlying hardware, has revolution-
ized the computing industry: large numbers (i.e. hundreds
of thousands) of generic hardware platforms, using multi-
core blade technology, are now coupled through high-
performance networking to produce a generic computing
surface. Any subset of this collection can be combined to
operate in tandem for a particular application using a
multitude of operating systems.
Conceptually, the hypervisor presents a virtual machine
abstraction that restricts malicious code, executing within
one instance of an operating system, from affecting a
different instance. Unfortunately, hypervisors have intro-
duced their own new security challenges: Adversaries now* Correspondence: Robert.M.Denz.TH@Dartmouth.edu
Thayer School of Engineering at Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, America
© 2013 Denz and Taylor; licensee Springer. Thi
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.or
in any medium, provided the original work is pactively attempt to detect the presence of an operating
hypervisor in order to tailor attacks accordingly [3]. A wide
range of hypervisor detection techniques have already
appeared against popular systems such as VMWare,
VirtualPC, Bochs, Hydra, Xen, and QEMU [4]. Often,
these techniques operate by exploiting timing differences
between virtualized and non-virtualized operations [5].
Alternatively, they detect unusual memory locations asso-
ciated with key operating system data structures [6]. For
example, the Red Pill technique works by using the SIDT
X-86 instruction to determine the location in memory of
the interrupt descriptor table; a machine running above a
hypervisor will return a location much higher in memory
than one that is not [7]. Following hypervisor detection,
the adversary then attacks either the operating system, the
virtual switch (vSwitch) sharing network connectivity bet-
ween virtual machines, or the hypervisor itself [8].
The presence of a hypervisor has no impact on the
vulnerabilities associated with the operating system. As a
result, any exploit that leverages a known vulnerability will
still operate successfully [9]. Although, a remote exploit
gives the adversary control of a single virtual machine, bys is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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Figure 1 The three cloud security techniques reviewed by this
paper: intrusion detection & prevention, secure hypervisors,
and virtual machines.
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promised. It is this vulnerability amplification that poses
the most significant threat to the future of cloud
computing.
Direct attacks against a vSwitch may undermine the
operation of multiple virtual machines on a single host
by denying connectivity to all of them simultaneously.
The vSwitch provides the same functionality as a phy-
sical switch and in consequence exhibits the same
vulnerabilities, enabling the same exploits [10]. For
example, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing,
involves the interception of valid network packets by
sending fake ARP packets to a switch [11].
Hypervisor attacks involve the direct exploitation of
vulnerabilities in the hypervisor. All virtual machines
executing on a hypervisor have distinct data structures,
separated in hardware. This separation forms a semantic
gap [12] that prevents virtual machines from having
visibility or impact upon each other’s data structures
[13]. Direct Kernel Structure Manipulation (DKSM)
bridges the semantic gap by patching virtual machine
data structures and redirecting hypervisor accesses to
shadow copies. This allows the virtual machine to
present false information to the hypervisor regarding the
virtual machine state, allowing implants, such as rootkits
[14], to persist without detection.
Virtualization provides inherent redundancy and ap-
pears to provide robust, large-scale, cost-effective avail-
ability of shared resources [15]. However, this perception
is tempered by the known risk of vulnerability amplifica-
tion and the paucity of knowledge regarding zero-day
exploitation in clouds: history has shown that lack of
detection does not imply lack of infection. Current miti-
gation techniques reviewed by this paper have already
evolved based on malware detection and prevention, se-
cure virtual machine managers, and cloud resilience.
These three categories and their roles in preventing an
attacker from gaining access to the cloud is illustrated in
Figure 1. Omitted from Figure 1 are cloud services that
provide authentication such as lightweight active direc-
tory protocol servers and trusted computing techniques
as they are outside the scope of this survey. Initially, the
attacker has to overcome or bypass the intrusion detec-
tion and prevention systems typically employed at the
cloud boundary. They are then faced with a secure
hypervisor usually installed on a single host; whose
purpose is to restrict access to kernel and hypervisor
data structures. Finally, cloud resilience is used by a host
to restore a single compromised or failed virtual ma-
chine to a known good state. Although not currently
prevalent throughout the industry, hypervisors offer the
opportunity to restrict the attacker’s access to the base
of the software stack. Since typically the number of
vulnerabilities is directly related to the number of sourcelines of code [16], this would allow tight control of the
hardware and allow operating system designers to build
successive layers on a secure base of trust. The small size
of the hypervisor also opens the door to formal reasoning
concerning its security properties [17]. Unfortunately,
these ideas have yet to be cohesively integrated and their
impact upon security quantified. In the sections that
follow we explore the building blocks that are available for
improving cloud security and assess them on the basis of
their performance impact, ability to reduce the attack sur-
face, detect known and zero-day threats, resolve detected
threats, and increase attacker workload by denying either
surveillance or persistence.
Threat model
The security implementation analyzed in this survey
address the threat model for intrusions employing remote
control outlined in Figure 2. It may involve several steps
including surveillance to determine if a vulnerability exists
[18], use of an appropriate exploit or other access method
[18], privilege escalation [19], removing exploit artifacts,
and hiding behavior [14]. Surveillance may involve obtain-
ing a copy of the binary code and using reverse engineer-
ing [20,21] or fuzzing [22] to facilitate a broad range of
attack vectors including return oriented programming
[23]. The implant then persists for a time sufficient
enough to carry out some malicious effect, obtain useful
information, or propagate intrusion to other systems.
Unlike the time to execute an exploit, the time spent
in surveillance and persistence may range from minutes
to months or even years depending upon the intended
effect. Moreover, the presence of an intrusion may never
be detected by network defenses but instead may be
recognized indirectly due to either a deviation from
expected behavior, or may be derived from intelligence
sources.
Nevertheless, each cloud security technique represents
an integral building block in the multilayered defense of
Figure 2 The threat model, detailing the process from surveillance to exploitation in the cloud.
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are the initial line of defense in preventing an attacker
from gaining a foothold on a cloud. The secure hypervi-
sors present a hardened code base that restricts access
to hardware to all, but the most privileged operations.
Lastly, cloud resilient solutions are present to protect
against the unknown exploits, which may allow an at-
tacker to operate on a cloud indefinitely.
Malware detection and prevention
Malware detection was one of the first techniques imple-
mented after the introduction of hypervisors. To achieve
this, researchers paired the proven technology of Intru-
sion Detection Systems (IDS) with the ability to hide in
a virtual machine. In this scenario, the IDS still performs
the same function of identifying patterns of malicious
behavior on a system that may be compromised [24]; for
example a proof of concept based on the Snort IDS
successfully prevented a Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack [25]. This implementation installed a
virtual machine that ran Snort on top of the VMware
hypervisor to monitor network traffic to all guest virtual
machines attached to a virtual switch. Once running, the
IDS dealt with DDoS attacks in two steps: Initially,
attacking computers were blocked by Snort; subse-
quently, the virtual server automatically moved the
application under attack to a new location in the cloud.
This demonstrated that an IDS can function inside the
cloud; however, the implementation was just as vulner-
able to zero-day attacks as non-virtualized IDS’s [26]:
attacks were missed due to IDS configuration and the
failure of signatures to detect new attacks.
The Hybrid Virtual IDS is a solution that leverages the
strengths of the cloud and improves upon the previous
Snort implementation [27]. The approach combines
resilience of a virtual IDS and the versatility offered by a
host based IDS. This is possible through the use of
integrity checking [28] and system call trace analysis[29]. Integrity checking is a static detection process in
which a changed file is compared to a gold standard to
determine if the change is malicious. System call trace
analysis dynamically flags anomalous system call behav-
ior as potentially dangerous. These two approaches are
implemented inside of a virtual machine to provide an
isolated environment. A custom hypervisor is then used
to ensure the isolation between all virtual machines. To
provide functionality to the IDS, the hypervisor has
hooks that allow the inspection of other guest virtual
machines running on the hypervisor. This allows the
hybrid virtual IDS to remain isolated from other running
virtual machines, while still allowing it to access data from
the virtual machines it is monitoring. This technique
performed well in testing conducted by the authors of the
Hybrid Virtual IDS, but returned unexpected performance
results: as the IDS decreases the length of time between
inspecting of the monitored virtual machine, the workload
processing time did not increase linearly as to be expected
and instead became erratic. The cause of this erratic per-
formance is open to additional research.
With the introduction of a hypervisor and a virtualized
IDS, it was only a matter of time before firewalls were
moved into the cloud. One of these virtual firewall
implementations is VMwall [30], which runs in the privi-
leged virtual machine that controls the Xen hypervisor
and uses virtual machine introspection [31]. This is the
process of inspecting the data structures of a separate
virtual machine. To enable this functionality, the Xen
hypervisor has added hooks that capture all network
connections created by a process. The data pertaining to
these connections is then passed to VMwall for analysis.
The connection is either allowed or blocked by using a
whitelist (a list of approved processes and connection
types). To deter false data during introspection, kernel
integrity checking [32] is used to verify the state of
kernel data structures in the guest virtual machines. This
is necessary, as the primary method of inspecting traffic
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may compromise the monitoring of traffic. However,
VMwall may be vulnerable to hijacking of a whitelisted
process or an already established connection. The only
method of detection against the compromise of an
approved process is through the checksumming of the
in-memory image of that process. This is performed by
ensuring that the hash of a process has not changed
from that of one contained in the whitelist. Due to the
performance impact of hash analysis, this method is
generally not implemented. Hijacking an established
connection can be partially prevented through time outs
associated with kernel rules contained in the whitelist.
To fully prevent this type of compromise, deep packet
inspection could be used, but is not currently employed
by VMwall. Importantly, the employed introspection
techniques cause a minimal performance impact: the add-
itional overhead is 7% for file transfers from hypervisor to
guest and 1% for file transfers from a guest to the hypervi-
sor. Added overhead for Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) and User Data Protocol (UDP) connections are
negligible; increases are measured in microseconds.
An alternative approach to detection techniques, like
VMwall and hybrid IDS, are prevention methods. One
security appliance that performs prevention is Malaware,
which is designed to prevent malware that tailors attacks
upon detection of a hypervisor [33]. To deter this initial
identification of a virtual environment, a signature based
method is used. In this instance, a signature is an in-
struction that should not be executed by an unprivileged
process. As an example, when a process such as Red Pill
attempts to run the SIDT instruction, it will be flagged
as malicious. However, as the authors of Malaware have
stated, a signature based approach is only effective
against known types of malware. To combat zero-day
threats, two behavior based approaches that utilize dy-
namic analysis are proposed [34]. This could be accom-
plished by first learning the current process and its page
table base address. With this, it is possible to check if
the current instruction register belongs to the process’
code pages. If this mapping does not exist, Malaware
could flag the process as malicious. The second dynamic
analysis method suggested is taint tracking. Changes to
the system, otherwise known as taint, are created, when
a process modifies any code or memory location. Ac-
cordingly, when taint is created in monitored locations,
the offending process is immediately flagged as mali-
cious. An added benefit of taint tracking is it defeats
malicious code that has been transformed to look harm-
less, also known as code obfuscation [35]. Once loaded
into a monitored region, the obfuscated code is imme-
diately marked as tainted and the associated process is
flagged as malicious. Unfortunately, only the signature
based piece of the detection has been implemented andno data relating to added overhead has been collected.
However, the initial detection results were promising
with a malware detection rate of 76%. Lastly, it is impor-
tant to note that techniques that alter known memory
states, such as address space layout randomization
(ASLR) may increase the difficulty of this type of taint
tracking [36].
Another prevention method, guest view casting [37],
moves malware prevention from the guest virtual machine
to the hypervisor. This approach reconstructs the data
structures of the guest for analysis at the hypervisor level.
This is achieved by translating guest virtual memory
addresses to physical memory addresses, then reading the
raw data from the guest’s virtual hard drive. The reas-
sembled state in the hypervisor can then be compared to
the guest’s state using viewing tools such as Windows
Task Manager and memory dump to display all processes
in memory. The presence of discrepancies between the
two states may indicate the existence of malware in the
guest. The authors have labeled this method of searching
for discrepancies between states as view comparison-based
malware detection. An outgrowth of this method is to use
anti-virus software to scan the guest’s state from inside of
the hypervisor. The use of anti-virus outside of the guest
shows that it identifies malware more effectively than
anti-virus running inside a virtual machine. Additionally,
performance of anti-virus is improved outside of the vir-
tual machine. The primary drawback to this approach is
the assumption that the hypervisor has not been compro-
mised. The authors agree that malicious code that targets
the hypervisor [38] can compromise their approach.
Although detection and prevention are important, the
last two decades have demonstrated that it is unlikely
that malware can be eliminated completely [39]. Security
researchers in an attempt to understand these attacks
have to rely on system logs that lack integrity [40] and
are often incomplete [41]. The ReVirt IDS [42], which
runs on UMLinux [43]; was created in an attempt to
improve upon these inadequacies. This is accomplished
by creating logs for all of the relevant system level infor-
mation needed to replay what transpired at an instruc-
tion by instruction level for a specific virtual machine.
This allows administrators to determine all the relevant
information pertaining to an attack. The overhead of
performing these functions is 13-58% for kernel tasks
and up to 8% for logging tasks.
Secure virtual machine managers
Hypervisors have afforded researchers with new security
capabilities. However, the hypervisor itself has come under
attack as a way of gaining control of a system [44]. This
has led to the introduction of Secure Hypervisors that
reduce the attack surface and increase reliability by
reducing the number of lines of code [16]. sHype [45],
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control flow enforcement first seen in SELinux [46] and
applying those controls on information flows between
virtual machines through a mandatory access control
model. Using intricate security policies; unfortunately,
these make it difficult to guarantee security and can be
over 50,000 lines of code [47]. To remove this level of
complexity, sHype affords the same control flow protec-
tions, but at the hypervisor level and without the need of
a policy administrator. These information flows are main-
tained through the use of a reference monitor that decides
what connections to accept and deny between virtual
machines. The sHype approach creates a flexible architec-
ture, which allows it to support many different security
modules [48]. This is accomplished in around 11,000 lines
of code; SELinux alone is over 85,000 lines of code.
The performance impact of sHype enforcement policies
is less than 1% [45]. However, sHype’s primary shortfall is
that it does not completely protect against unauthorized
transfer of information between two virtual machines that
are not allowed to share information. Figure 3 illustrates
the problem: nodes A, B, and C represent three different
virtual machines and all are connected to a reference
monitor. Virtual machines A and B are not allowed to
share information, but both are allowed to share informa-
tion with virtual machine C. A covert channel is created,
when virtual machine C acts as an intermediary and
passes information between A and B. In this case the
reference monitor would not intervene, as it only sees
information being transferred from A to C and from C to
B. Fortunately, the addition of a Chinese wall (communi-
cation rules) can be added to sHype to protect against this
covert channel [49]. In this case, the rule would only allow
two of the three virtual machines to run at any one
time. However, this method has the drawback of
causing a decrease in performance of up to 9.1% [50].Figure 3 An example of a covert channel, where node A
transfers information to node B, through the intermediary
node C.This performance impact can be mitigated by perfor-
ming Chinese wall policy checks at virtual machine
creation and then caching these decisions. Since, pol-
icy changes are infrequent, this configuration reduces
the performance impact to less than 1% [51].
A different direction from control flow enforcement is
used in the noHype hypervisor [52]. This minimalist
approach removes as much as possible from the hyper-
visor; unfortunately, no published numbers for lines of
code are available. However, the first prototype was
based on a stripped down version of Xen 4.0; implying
that it falls somewhere less than 1.6 million lines of code
[53]. The code count was reduced by shrinking the size
of the hypervisor by following four rules. First, noHype
pre-allocates processor cores and memory to virtual ma-
chines. This allows the virtual machine to control its
own hardware, which improves performance. Second,
each virtual machine is assigned its own I/O device.
Being in the cloud, it is assumed that these virtual
machines only need network interface cards (NIC). The
issue here is that servers have a limited number of NICs.
Thankfully, newer NICs take advantage of Single-Root I/
O Virtualization [54], which allows them to present
themselves as multiple NICs. Thus, each virtual machine
on a server is able to receive its own NIC, even if there
are more virtual machines than NICs. Third, noHype
provides the user with a predefined guest virtual ma-
chine in order to control the discovery of hardware. This
also prevents a user from uploading a malicious guest
virtual machine, which could attack the hypervisor.
Lastly, noHype avoids indirection that occurs through
the creation of virtual cores and memory, since cores
and memory are assigned directly to each virtual
machine. These four principles were tested against a
standard Xen 4.0 install and startup time was reduced
by 1% in the noHype implementation. However, noHype
loses the ability to perform any introspection of the
guest virtual machines as the hypervisor is limited in
functionality. Thus, a virtual machine in the noHype
cloud could become infected without noHype being
aware of the infection.
Another popular feature of the cloud is live migration
of virtual machines [55]. This can be seamlessly ac-
complished with little downtime thanks to virtualization.
However, migrations lose the states maintained by state-
ful firewalls [56] and IDS’ [57]. These states can be
maintained using a network security enabled hypervisor
(NSE-H) designed on top of the Xen hypervisor [58].
This builds on the concepts used in secure hypervisors,
but adds support for secure file transfers. The perform-
ance impact of this method is measured in downtime,
which is the time a virtual machine is not available
during transfer. The cost of securing these migrations is
up to a 15% increase in downtime versus downtime of
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reasons when maintaining the security context of the
virtual machines being migrated. The first is the add-
itional time needed to securely copy a virtual machine’s
memory space from one host to another. The second is
the NSE-H security additions, as they are using add-
itional resources on the system.
Cloud resilience
An often over-looked aspect of cloud computing is
Resilience, defined as the ability for a system to recover
and continue to provide services when a loss of hard-
ware or software occurs [59]. One such system, Cloud
Resilience for Windows (CReW) [60], expands the idea
of resilience to the security domain through the use of
strong security in guest virtual machines [61], and intro-
spection [62]. Implementation is on top of the 270,000
plus lines of code that comprise the kernel-based virtual
machine hypervisor [63]. This has enabled CReW to
effectively prevent attacks from some rootkits and repair
any damage they may have caused, but at a cost to per-
formance as the number of virtual machines increases
or security level is raised. At a strict level with three
virtual machines, CReW adds ~48% increase in time
needed for CPU tasks and ~279% increase in time
required for I/O related tasks. For the paranoid setting,
CReW adds ~116% increase in time for CPU related
tasks and adds ~347% increase in time for I/O related
tasks [60].
A technique that builds upon the ideas presented in
CReW and supports other operating systems is that of
hypervisor-based efficient proactive recovery [64]. This
approach makes the assumption that no matter what
defense is implemented on the cloud, a machine will
eventually be maliciously compromised or taken offline.
Thus, after particular failure conditions are met, the
guest virtual machine is refreshed from a gold standard.
A prototype of these concepts was developed using a
modified Xen hypervisor [65]. Testing has shown there
is a balance between throughput and availability. Thus, a
user of this method can choose between lower through-
put and higher availability or higher throughput and
lower availability when faults occur.
The Bear operating system is a minimalist implemen-
tation that builds resiliency on top of a secure hypervisor
[66]. A key design choice is the strong enforcement of
separating core functionality into four layers, which is
typical of modern micro kernels, like the MINIX opera-
ting system [67]. Importantly, the attack surface is
reduced with a shared code base (>50%) of 10,903 lines
of code shared between the Bear Hypervisor and Kernel.
The size is attributable to a small custom hypervisor and
small custom kernel. Resiliency is derived from non-
deterministically refreshing the virtual machines on thehypervisor to a gold standard after a period of time. This
refresh is done by starting a second virtual machine
from the known valid state and then transferring func-
tionality to it, all while simultaneously tearing down the
first virtual machine. By using this method, control is
seamlessly transferred between virtual machines and
without an impact to performance. Also, any known or
zero-day malware present on the torn down virtual ma-
chine will not be present on the newly started virtual
machine.
Comparative analysis
Table 1 presents a summary comparison, of the approa-
ches based on reduction of the attack surface, prevention
of zero-day threats, and overhead. The “Reduces Attack
Surface” category shows that all of the technologies
other than sHype and Bear rely on a large code base.
This poses a concern, as demonstrated by the authors of
“Reliability Issues in Open Source Software”, who have
shown that errors occur at a rate of .09 defects per thou-
sand lines of open source code. This problem is worse
for closed source systems, with .57 defects per thousand
lines of code. Although the numbers will vary with code
base naturally, this result that indicates Xen will have
144 defects, KVM 25, UMLinux 162, sHype and Bear
each present a single defect. An interesting comparison
was provided between open source software and closed
source software. Due to the partial unintended release of
300,000 lines of VMware kernel code; the code could
contain up to 171 defects, which is more defects then a
full install of UMLinux. Obviously, sHype and Bear sys-
tems are a bare minimum install and have less function-
ality when compared to the other hypervisors. This has
led to the sHype architecture being ported to the Xen
hypervisor by the authors of “Building a MAC-Based
Security Architecture for the Xen Open-Source Hypervisor”,
which has the net effect of increasing functionality and
potential number of defects. The key takeaway is that a
small code size and open source distribution are desir-
able to prove a system to be reliable and secure. How-
ever, closed source systems, which are outside of the
purview of this article, do exist and provide similar secu-
rity features. Two such commercial hypervisors not
reviewed are Citrix XenClient and HyTrust.
After evaluating each system on its abilities to perform
“Malware Detection” and “Prevents Zero-Days”; there
were two clear outliers. Malware detection and prevention
methods primarily protect against known threats, because
of their use of whitelists and signatures. However, ReVirt
is the outlier in this category, as it provides capabilities to
remove zero-days; unlike its counterparts, it has no ability
to detect malware. Secure hypervisors restrict access to
the hypervisor but generally provide no malware detection
abilities or zero-day prevention. Lastly, resilient systems
Table 1 Comparison summary of surveyed systems
Cloud security implementation Reduces attack surface
(lines of code)
Malware detection Mitigates zero-day
threats
Added overhead (%)
Malaware > 725 K Yes No No data
Guest view casting > 1,600 K Yes No Reduced up to 70%
Virtual snort > 300 K Yes No No data
Hybrid IDS > 300 K Yes No ~4-36%
VMwall ~ 1,600 K Yes No 1-7%
ReVirt ~ 1,800 K No Yes 8-58%
NSE-H > 1,600 K No No 15%
Shype ~ 11 k No No < 1%
Shype with Chinese wall in critical path > 1,600 K No No 9.1%
Shype with Chinese wall outside critical path > 1,600 k No No < 1%
NoHype < 1,600 K No No Reduced up to 1%
CReW > 270 K Yes Yes ~48-347%
Hypervisor-based proactive recovery ~ 1,600 K Yes Yes ~8-12.7%
Bear ~ 11 k Not applicable Yes < 1%
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have shown promising results in both categories. The
model of whitelists and signatures is replaced with restor-
ation upon detection of anomalous system behavior. Thus,
both known malware and zero-days are removed from the
system when it is restored to a valid state. Resilient sys-
tems do not prevent the initial compromise from known
threats, unlike malware prevention and detection systems.
The outlier in this group is Bear, which makes no attempt
to check for anomalous behavior. Instead, it assumes the
system will eventually be compromised and therefore
refreshes the system non-deterministically. This has the
same end result of removing any known or zero-day at-
tacks that may be present, but also invalidates surveillance
and prevents persistence. Nevertheless, the effectiveness
of resilient systems warrants further research.
The final category of “Added Overhead” is important,
as no technique should overly impact system perform-
ance. Both secure hypervisors and malware prevention
and detection schemes can minimally impact and in
some cases improve performance. The larger resilient
prototypes such as CReW and hypervisor proactive
recovery have not yet reached this level of performance.
Bear however, has had a negligible impact on perform-
ance when refreshing virtual machines. Research into
future resilient system implementations should aim to
maintain the performance levels set by intrusion detection
and prevention systems, secure hypervisors, and the Bear
operating system. This can be achieved by leveraging the
proven practices of either adding functionality to the
hypervisor as seen in Guest View Casting or reducing the
hypervisor foot print as accomplished by NoHype and
Bear. Once this performance requirement is met, furthercapabilities can be added to resilient systems, which allow
for the creation of a new cloud security architecture.
Related fields of work
One field of study that has not been included in this sur-
vey is the idea of trust [68] in regards to the unauthorized
access of data. One approach to handle trust in data secur-
ity is that of security labels in the cloud [69]. The goal of
this approach is to isolate customer virtual machines from
each other to prevent data leakage across virtual machi-
nes. This work is an enhancement of a trusted hypervisor
that extends trust to network storage [70]. In regards to
privacy, customers are concerned that their personal
information will be leaked to those who should not have
access to it. A current solution to this problem is the use
of encryption with access control [71]. Using public key
cryptography in the cloud, the user can be sure that their
data is safe and only they have access to it.
Conclusion
All of the techniques reviewed in this paper have pro-
duced gains in making cloud computing more secure.
Most of the solutions strive to race to the bottom of the
software stack to combat known risks, rather than un-
known zero-day risks. Moreover, it is currently left up to
the cloud provider to pick from a grab bag of techniques
to secure their infrastructure. This has led to a diverse set
of approaches in cloud security, each with its own goals.
The most successful approaches could be combined to
build new cloud infrastructure. A starting point would be
to begin with the idea of resilience as discussed in this
paper. Non-determinism could then be added through
process specific virtual machines. Multiple copies of these
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ministic manner. Lastly, secure migrations of processes
and whole virtual machines can be added. Combining all
these techniques could provide a cloud computing envir-
onment that drastically increases attacker workload.
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